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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 923I. IntroductionLonger unemployment durations of older workers have long been
viewed as potentially reflecting hiring discrimination against older work-
ers. This inference was surely easier to establish when there were explicit
maximum age criteria in hiring ads (US Department of Labor 1965), but
the persistence of lengthier unemployment durations for older workers,
and ongoing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) en-
forcement activity, at least suggest that older workers are disadvantaged
in the job search process.1
A number of studies have used audit or correspondence (AC) study
methods to test for age discrimination in hiring. These past studies nearly
uniformly point to age discrimination in hiring (Bendick, Jackson, and
Romero 1997; Bendick, Brown, and Wall 1999; Riach and Rich 2006,
2010; Lahey 2008).2 However, the existing experimental evidence is po-
tentially flawed in ways that could bias estimates of age discrimination in
either direction. One issue is the practice of giving older and younger
applicants similar labor market experience, consistent with the standard
approach in these studies. However, the absence of relevant experience
commensurate with an older applicant’s age may be a negative signal,
andon real-world resumes, older applicants report experience commensu-
rate with their age. Second,Heckman and Siegelman (1993) andHeckman
(1998) have demonstrated that if the groups studied have different vari-
ances of unobservables, experimental estimates of discrimination can be bi-
ased in either direction (formally, it is unidentified). This problemmay be
especially salient with respect to age, as the human capital model predicts
greater dispersion inunobserved investments amongolder workers (Mincer
1974; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 2006). Thus, it is hard to know what to
make of the existing experimental evidence of age discrimination.
To provide more compelling evidence on age discrimination, we con-
ducted a large-scale field experiment—a resume correspondence study—1 For recent data on unemployment rates, see http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat31.pdf.
The EEOC reports receipt of 20,857 charges of discrimination under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) in 2016, 2,162 of which are related to hiring. These fig-
ures exclude claims filed with state agencies; see https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/statistics
/enforcement/statutes_by_issue.cfm?renderforprint51 and https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/adea.cfm.
2 A summary table is available in the online appendix.
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Allexplicitly designed to address the potential limitations and sources of bias
in the previous experiments. We also study ages closer to retirement than
in past studies and use a richer set of job profiles for older workers to ad-
dress a number of additional questions and provide some help in distin-
guishingpotentialmechanisms of discrimination.On the basis of evidence
from over 40,000 job applications, we find robust evidence of age discrim-
ination in hiring against older women, especially those near retirement
age. But we find that the evidence for men is less robust and that evidence
of age discrimination against themmay at least inpart reflect thebiases this
study was designed to assess.
Knowing whether age discrimination deters employment of older
workers is critical for at least two economic reasons. First, the aging of
the population in the United States (and elsewhere), coupled with lower
employment of older individuals, implies a rising dependency ratio and
fiscal challenges for Social Security. Increasing work at older ages can
help meet the fiscal challenge by increasing payroll tax receipts (US Gov-
ernment Accounting Office 1999). If age discrimination is an important
demand-side barrier to extending work lives, then the policy response to
population agingmay need to include addressing this barrier, in addition
to strengthening work incentives for older individuals who might other-
wise retire. Age discrimination in hiring may be particularly critical to
whether older workers canwork substantially longer, becausemany seniors
transition to part-time or shorter-term “partial retirement” or “bridge jobs”
at the end of their careers (e.g., Johnson, Kawachi, and Lewis 2009) or re-
turn to work after a period of retirement (Maestas 2010). Second, there
are economic costs of trying to root out hiring behavior defined as illegal
by antidiscrimination laws. For those costs that we can reasonably quantify,
we estimate that the costs of potential and actual hiring cases under the
ADEA are about $3.29 billion per year, which is about $5,300 per firm cov-
ered by the ADEA, or about $35 per covered employee, the vast majority
of which are compliance costs.3 Our study is well designed to detect the
behavior that these laws are designed to reduce or eliminate and hence3 The detailed components of this cost estimate are discussed in the online appendix but
include, for thepurposes of this calculation,monetary damages of EEOC cases ($4.6million,
or $7.42 per covered firm per year), the greater of litigation costs or settlement costs paid by
the firms (litigation is greater, so $9.67million to $44.48million per year, or $15.62 to $71.76
per covered employer per year), EEOC administrative costs ($5.0 million, or $8.06 per cov-
ered firm per year), and compliance costs ($3.24 billion, or $5,226 per covered firm per
year).Using theupper estimate for the litigation costs, this leads to total costs of $3.29 billion,
or $5,315 per covered firm and $34.64 per covered employee. This does not include costs
such as time spent by executives and management as part of these cases, damages for cases
handled at the state level rather thanby theEEOC, administrative costs for state agencies that
enforce state laws, and productivity losses or gains from induced changes in employers’ hir-
ing behavior.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 925is informative about whether these costs are being borne to address an ex-
tant problem.
At the same time, this evidence does not necessarily dictate the appro-
priate policy response to reduce discrimination, in large part because it is
difficult to distinguish between taste-based and statistical discrimination.
The most natural policy response to taste discrimination à la Becker
(1971) is to raise the cost to employers of engaging in discriminatory be-
havior, effectively restoring equal prices for labor from equally produc-
tive groups. The appropriate policy response to statistical discrimination
is more complicated. If statistical discrimination is based on correct ste-
reotypes (i.e., the group averages employers use are correct), then it
may not introduce any inefficiency. Policy interventions that increase in-
formation about older applicants will help those applicants that defy the
stereotypes in positive directions, and vice versa, so that the main ratio-
nale for policy intervention may be equity.4 If statistical discrimination
is based on incorrect negative stereotypes about older workers, then
such policy interventions can increase hiring of older workers as a group.
While AC methods can establish evidence of discrimination, discerning
between taste and statistical discrimination is much more challenging,
although we argue that many features of our study design, and the find-
ings, make it relatively more likely that taste discrimination underlies our
findings, when we find evidence of age discrimination. Of course, policy
makers may have a goal of increasing employment of older workers re-
gardless of the nature of the discrimination, even if such behavior might
be hard to rationalize on efficiency grounds.5II. Past Nonexperimental Research
on Age DiscriminationAs noted above, prior to the passage of the ADEA, explicit age restrictions
in hiring ads were frequent (USDepartment of Labor 1965). In addition,
workers in their 50s and early 60s have long had lengthier unemployment
durations thanmany other age groups.6 There is evidence of negative ste-4 Affirmative action policies may act in this fashion, reducing reliance on cheap screens
like race (Holzer and Neumark 2000; Miller 2017). If productivity depends on the quality
of the job match, then statistical discrimination based on correct stereotypes can be inef-
ficient and an information intervention can enhance efficiency.
5 Consider, e.g., the example of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which not only bars
discrimination against individuals with disabilities but also requires employers to pay rea-
sonable costs of accommodation.
6 Age discrimination leading to longer unemployment durations of older workers does
not necessarily entail lost output and welfare if it simply reallocates time unemployed from
younger to older workers without increasing the total time all workers spend unemployed.
However, such reallocation seems likely to generate such losses if older workers respond to
long unemployment durations by choosing to retire, in part because they can claim Social
Security benefits earlier (consistent with evidence in Adams [2002]).
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Allreotypes regarding older workers in hypothetical scenarios tying atti-
tudes toward older workers to adverse labor market outcomes for them
(Gordon and Arvey 2004; Kite et al. 2005). Finally, workers report expe-
riencing age discrimination on the job, and these workers subsequently
exhibit more separations, lower employment, slower wage growth, and
reduced expectations of working past 62 or 65 ( Johnson and Neumark
1997; Adams 2002).
However, these results from observational data are hardly decisive evi-
dence of age discrimination. For example, longer unemployment dura-
tions could reflect higher reservation wages of unemployed older work-
ers or narrower search rather than discrimination. Self-reports of age
discrimination may reflect other negative outcomes workers experience,
followed by leaving the firm, experiencing fewer promotions or raises,
and so forth. That is, as is often a concern with observational evidence
on discrimination, unobservables may underlie the evidence. Thus, as
in research on discrimination along other dimensions, researchers have
turned to AC studies to provide more compelling evidence on age dis-
crimination. However, there are numerous challenges to applying such
methods to age discrimination, which this paper tries to overcome.III. Applying Experimental Methods to Studying
Age Discrimination in Hiring
A. The General MethodExperimental audit or correspondence (AC) studies of hiring are gener-
ally viewed as the most reliable means of inferring labor market discrim-
ination (e.g., Fix and Struyk 1993).While observational studies try to con-
trol for productivity differences between groups, AC studies create
artificial job applicants in which there are intended to be no average dif-
ferences by group, so that differences in outcomes likely reflect discrim-
ination. Audit studies use actual applicants coached to act alike and cap-
ture job offers, whereas correspondence studies create fake applicants
(on paper or electronically) and capture “callbacks” for job interviews.
Correspondence studies can collect far larger samples of job applications
and outcomes, especially using the internet; because of the time costs of
interviews, even large-scale, expensive audit studies typically have sample
sizes only in the hundreds. Correspondence studies also avoid “experi-
menter effects” that can influence the behavior of the actual applicants
used in audit studies (Heckman and Siegelman 1993). Correspondence
studies have the disadvantage of not capturing actual job offers but just
callbacks; however, evidence discussed below indicates that callbacks cap-
ture most of the relevant discrimination. For these reasons, our experi-
ment is a correspondence study.This content downloaded from 154.059.124.102 on April 20, 2020 08:32:58 AM
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 927As noted above, there are challenges in applying AC methods to age
discrimination. We first outline a framework for thinking about AC stud-
ies in a less problematic setting—with reference to race—and then turn
to the application to age discrimination.7 The underlying idea is that em-
ployers try to assess whether an applicant’s productivity exceeds a given
threshold with sufficiently high probability, and if it does, the applicant
is offered a callback or a job. Think of this productivity as a fixed charac-
teristic that depends on observed characteristics X I and an unobserved
characteristic X II that is the source of the uncertainty. In the population,
with B a dummy indicator for blacks, expected productivity (P) of blacks
and whites differs. Supposing the former is lower,
E P jB 5 1ð Þ < E P jB 5 0ð Þ: (1)
In AC studies we create resumes (containing X I) intended to be of
identical quality, so that
EðP jB 5 1, X IÞ 5 EðP jB 5 0, X IÞ: (2)
A difference in selection for callbacks or job offers (denoted T ), such
that
TfEðP jB 5 1, X IÞ, B 5 1g < TfEðP jB 5 0, X IÞ, B 5 0g, (3)
is interpreted as evidence of discrimination against blacks in hiring.8 If
equation (2) in fact holds, we would interpret the evidence as closest to
Becker’s (1971) employer taste discrimination, with the productivity of
blacks undervalued by discriminatory employers. But an alternative is
that instead of equation (2),
EðP jB 5 1, X IÞ < EðP jB 5 0, X IÞ: (4)
This corresponds to statistical discrimination, because an employer as-
sumes lower productivity for blacks despite having identical information
on black and white applicants, which can still generate the difference in
outcomes in equation (3). However, both types of discrimination are ille-
gal under US law.9
Thus, the difference in callback or offer rates conditional on identical
resumes does not directly distinguish between taste and statistical dis-
crimination. Some AC studies try to rule out statistical discrimination7 We thank Bentley MacLeod for suggesting this framework for thinking about the ap
plication of correspondence studies to age discrimination.
8 As in Heckman (1998), we would think of Tfg as a dichotomous outcome based on
the probability—given unobservables—that productivity exceeds a threshold for hiring.
9 EEOC regulations state, “An employer may not base hiring decisions on stereotypes
and assumptions about a person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), nationa
origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information” (http://www1.eeoc.gov//laws
/practices/index.cfm?renderforprint51).
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Allby including information on which employers might statistically discrim-
inate, such as including detailed residential information that may hold
socioeconomic status and criminality constant (e.g., Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan 2004). In that sense, we can think of equation (2) as the iden-
tifying assumption for identifying taste-/animus-based discrimination
from an AC study. And when this assumption does not hold, the estimate
of discrimination includes statistical discrimination.
Economistsmay be interested not only in identifying illegal discrimina-
tion but in understanding its nature, for both scientific and policy rea-
sons. Researchers have tried to distinguish between these two models
of discrimination in AC studies, but the tests require very strong assump-
tions on what employers know about workers, and when they know it.10
A more fundamental critique is that even in the best-case scenario
when equation (2) holds and there is no statistical discrimination, a dif-
ference in the variance of the unobservable determinants of productivity
not included in the resumes can generate bias in either direction, render-
ing discrimination unidentified in AC studies (Heckman and Siegelman
1993; Heckman 1998)—the “Heckman critique.” Denote the standard
deviations of the unobservable X II for blacks and whites as jB II and jW II.
In designing an AC study, a researcher chooses the resume quality (the
standardized level of productivity X I, denoted X I*). Suppose that X I* is
set low relative to the resumes the employer actually sees. Then if jB II >
jW
II, blacks are more likely to exceed a given productivity threshold; in-
tuitively, if the resumes are, on average, low-quality, then the low-variance
group (whites, in this case) is very unlikely to have high productivity, and
vice versa. In contrast, if jB II < jW II and X I* is low, whites will be favored.
Since the researcher does not knowwhetherX I* is loworhighnor whether
jB
II is greater or less than jW II, it is not possible even to sign the bias.
Neumark (2012) proposed a solution to this problem that separately
identifies the relative variances of the unobservables and the difference
TfEðP jB 5 1, X IÞ, B 5 1g 2 TfEðP jB 5 0, X IÞ, B 5 0g,
discussed more below. In our view, correspondence studies with this cor-
rection for bias from different variances of the unobservables provide the
most compelling evidence of labormarket discrimination available. How-
ever, particular challenges arise in studies of age discrimination, to which
we turn in the next subsection.10 For example, some studies add information to a subset of resumes and interpret a de-
cline in the race gap as evidence of statistical discrimination based on this added informa-
tion (Kaas and Manger 2012). But if we add information that is not the basis for employers’
statistical discrimination, then a null finding of no change in offer or callback rates is un-
informative. Rooth (2010) pioneered a different approach to learn about the nature of dis-
crimination in an AC study, administering the Implicit Association Test for implicit dis-
crimination to those who reviewed the applications.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 929It is also useful to think about what the evidence from ACmethods can
tell us about the fundamental elements of the job search process. In job
searchmodels, a searching worker’s probability of finding work in a given
period is a positive function of the vacancy rate in the market in which he
or she is searching and a negative function of the unemployment rate,
which can be summarized in the job offer arrival rate.11 Job searchmodels
also predict that the probability of a match is a negative function of the
job searcher’s reservation wage and a negative function of the length
of time the person has been unemployed (assuming there is negative du-
ration dependence, as suggested in recent work by Kroft, Lange, and
Notowidigdo [2013]).
What would evidence of lower job offer or callback rates to older work-
ers imply about the likelihood of older workers finding amatch? Presum-
ably, such evidence speaks most directly to differences in the arrival rate
of job offers for older workers. The evidence does not directly capture
reservation wages, although it is possible that either the lower job offer
arrival rate anticipated ex ante or the longer spells of unemployment that
result will lower reservation wages of older job applicants, which could
counter the lower number of job offers they anticipate or actually receive.
This latter channel highlights the fact that job applicants may respond to
a lower rate of job offers that AC studies detect in ways that offset what
would otherwise be a lower rate of matching to jobs. But this could come
at a cost in terms of lower wages. The persistent longer unemployment
durations of older workers (Neumark and Button 2014), while poten-
tially attributable to many factors, are at least consistent with reservation
wages not declining enough to reduce unemployment durations to those
of younger workers.12B. Challenges in Audit and Correspondence Studies
of Age DiscriminationThe challenges in applying AC methods to age discrimination can be
couched in terms of the issues discussed in the previous section. Letting
S be a dummy indicator for old (“senior”), equation (2), which we sug-
gested could be interpreted as the key identifying assumption, becomes
EðP jS 5 1, X IÞ 5 EðP jS 5 0, X IÞ: (5)11 When vacancies are higher, a job searcher is more likely to match to a vacancy; and
when the unemployment rate is higher, a job searcher is less likely to match to a vacancy
because there is more competition for that vacancy.
12 For example, older workers may search among a narrower subset of jobs with fewer
physical demands or still maintain higher reservation wages owing to the same rising mar-
ginal utility of leisure that we think underlies retirement behavior.
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AllThere could be animus toward older workers—perhaps less because of
“dislike” of older workers than because of negative attributes associated
with them—in which case the interpretation of differential treatment
based on age in equation (5) parallels other applications of ACmethods.
However, the assumption that equation (5) holds is more problematic
with respect to age for a few reasons.Matching on ExperienceIt is not clear how to match older and younger workers on resumes to
make it most likely that equation (5) holds. Clearly, a young applicant
cannot have the experience of a long-employed older worker. Blind ap-
plication of the AC study “paradigm” would hence dictate giving older
and younger applicants low levels of experience commensurate with
the young applicants’ ages. However, this can make the older applicants
in the study appear less qualified than the older applicants employers
usually see, creating a bias toward finding evidence of discrimination
against older workers. In other words, matching on a low level of experi-
ence (included in X I) can lead to
EðP jS 5 1, X IÞ < EðP jS 5 0, X IÞ, (6)
which could explain the evidence in past studies.13Statistical DiscriminationThere may be reasons for employers to statistically discriminate against
older workers. In some cases, there is evidence that may help assess the
importance of statistical versus taste discrimination.
First, some physical capacities that are not conveyed on the resumes
can decline with age. Existing research also points out that some capaci-
ties may increase with age, although we do not know whether the partic-
ular capacities important to employers in our study (which may also be
legally permissible bona fide occupational qualifications) tend to decline13 Researchers are aware of this problem. Bendick et al. (1997) had both older and youn-
ger applicants report 10 years of similar experience on their resumes. However, they had
the resumes for older applicants indicate that they had been out of the labor force raising
children (for female executive secretary applications) or working as a high school teacher
(for male or mixed applications). Lahey (2008) studies women, for whom she argues that
time out of the labor force is less likely to be a negative signal. She then includes only a 10-
year job history for all applicants (in part based on conversations with three human re-
sources professionals she cites who said that 10-year histories were the “gold standard”).
However, the older resumes in either study could convey a negative signal.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 931or not.14 Second, and related, employers might expect older workers to
have health problems, which could raise absenteeism or pose accommo-
dation costs (Neumark, Song, andButton 2017).While absenteeism costs
could matter, health insurance costs may matter less; existing legislation
and regulations recognize the potential for higher health insurance costs
for older workers and permit, in limited circumstances, reduced health
benefits based on age.15
Third, employers might expect that older workers (our oldest group
is 64–66) would be near retirement and hence firms may be less likely
to want to invest in them. This source of statistical discrimination should,
however, be relatively unimportant. We study low-skill jobs in which train-
ing and turnover costs are likely to beminimal. Also, younger workers are
more likely to leave an employer for other jobs, and the reason for turn-
over is irrelevant to the employer. For example, 2015 (quarter 1) data
from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators show a lower separation rate
for workers aged 55–64 (9.9 percent) than for workers aged 25–34
(18.7 percent).16 Lower separation rates for older workers overall may
represent behavior of high-tenure workers rather than older new hires,
and the behavior of old versus young new hires is most relevant. However,
other evidence indicates that older new hires have similar or lower sepa-
ration rates compared to younger new hires within the first year of new
employment (Choi and Fernández-Blanco 2017).17
Fourth, older applicants with experience commensurate to their age
applying for the same job as a younger applicant might be viewed as less
qualified or having less potential, because they have been at that job level
for longer, that is, have a slower “speed of success” (Tinkham 2010); this
can be interpreted as older workers searching for new jobs beingmore ad-
versely selected than younger workers. On a priori grounds, it is not clear
that an employer should be more interested in younger applicants with14 Belbase, Sanzenbacher, and Gillis (2015) conclude that some abilities tend to decline
with age (e.g., explosive strength, manual dexterity, memorization, and spatial orientation),
while others (e.g., static strength, stamina, oral comprehension, and originality) tend not to
decline, into the mid-60s and even beyond. For earlier evidence indicating the absence of
decline in various work-related capacities, see Jablonski, Kunze, andRosenblum (1990), Pos-
ner (1995), and Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999).
15 See https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/age.cfm. Section 623 of the ADEA pro-
hibits age discrimination in hiring based on benefits.
16 These rates are relative to beginning-of-quarter employment. Our youngest age range
is 29–31. For details on the data, see http://qwiexplorer.ces.census.gov/#x50&g50.
17 Specifically, the authors compute transitions from employment to nonemployment
within 1 year of taking a new job, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation. They report two computations pertaining to age. First, the average age of “stayers”
is 33.8 vs. 28.9 for nonstayers. Second, and better isolating differences at older ages, the au-
thors provided us with calculations showing the overall percentage of new employees mov-
ing to nonemployment within the year. This percentage is 36.4 for both ages 25–34 and ages
55–64.
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Allmore potential, given that they have high separation rates. Moreover, our
young applicants have been in the low-responsibility jobs we study for about
10 years, and older workers often take less demanding jobs on the path to
retirement (bridge jobs); so looking for a low-skilled job at an older age
would not necessarily convey a particularly negative signal. Finally, we have
evidence from our study design, discussed below, to help rule this out.
Fifth, employers may make assumptions about skill differences across
cohorts—perhaps most important that older applicants have fewer com-
puter skills. Some of the skill variation we build into the resumes (ex-
plained below) allows us to assess whether the differences in callback rates
we observe could be due to assumptions about differences in computer
skills; we find that this does not account for our evidence.
Sixth, we would expect that older cohorts of women spent more time
at home than younger cohorts. Given that, for older cohorts of women,
these labor market interruptions would have beenmany years in the past,
it is unlikely they could account for current differences in callback rates by
age. Alternatively, employers might discriminate against younger women,
expecting them to drop out to care for children. However, this would cre-
ate a bias against finding discrimination against older women, which would
only strengthen our findings. Finally, evidence from differences in out-
comes across resume types we use, discussed below, further helps rule out
a role for caring for children.
Finally, because educational attainment is higher in younger cohorts,
expected ability differences between younger and older cohorts could ex-
plain why seemingly identical resumesmay not satisfy equation (5). For ex-
ample, on the basis of the 2015 Current Population Survey Annual Social
and Economic Supplement, 21.3 percent of young women (aged 25–34)
had a high school diploma, and 27.9 percent had a bachelor’s degree, as
their highest degree.18 For older women (aged 60–69), the first percent-
age was higher (32.6 percent) and the second lower (16.8 percent). For
men, thedifferences are qualitatively similar but less pronounced.Theper-
centages of youngermenwith atmost a high school diplomawere 28.3 per-
cent versus 24.2 percent with a bachelor’s degree; the corresponding
percentages for oldermen were 29.0 percent and 20.1 percent. More pos-
itive selection into higher levels of education for older cohorts could gen-
erate a bias against finding discrimination against older, equally educated
applicants. However, given that the education difference is considerably
stronger for women than for men, yet our evidence of age discrimination
is stronger for women, we do not think these cross-cohort education dif-
ferences drive our results.18 These data were downloaded from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series—Cur-
rent Population Survey (Flood et al. 2015).
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 933In some cases, the available evidence suggests that statistical discrimi-
nation along particular dimensions may not be very likely. However, we
cannot rule out statistical discrimination as a cause of lower callback rates
for older workers. Moreover, in some ways it may be easier to reject evi-
dence of statistical discrimination because it might have a refutable impli-
cation, whereas taste discrimination tends to be a residual explanation.
Nonetheless, at a minimum we believe there is evidence to indicate that
lower callback rates for older workers should not be automatically attrib-
uted to statistical discrimination.19
In light of this discussion, it is useful to point out both the positive and
normative implications of our evidence. As described above with respect
to job search, our study yields positive evidence on the role of age in job
search and hence job finding behavior—as reflected in the question the
title of our paper poses. The potential normative evidence pertains to
the implications of the evidence for policy to counter age discrimination,
which can be motivated—if there is evidence of age discrimination—by
both fairness concerns and the imperative to increase employment of
older workers to counter population aging. Our study can establish evi-
dence of age discrimination, and depending on how strongly one views
the arguments against interpreting such evidence as reflecting statistical
discrimination as opposed to taste discrimination, it can also provide guid-
ance as to appropriate policy responses.The Heckman Critique Applied to Older
versus Younger WorkersThe problem of bias from different variances of the unobservable may
be particularly salient in an age discrimination study. Denoting the stan-
darddeviations ofX II for old and youngworkers jS II and jY II, there is a good
reason to suspect that jS II > jY II. Specifically, the human capital model
(Mincer 1974) predicts that differential investments in human capital accu-
mulate with age; recent evidence based on wage dispersion is presented in
Heckman et al. (2006). And variation in investment is unlikely to be fully
conveyed on the resumes. If the study design used relatively low-quality ap-
plicants, then the higher variance for older applicants generates a bias19 A potential reason to bemore skeptical of taste discrimination as a source of differences
in callbacks is Becker’s (1971) argument that competitive markets may eliminate employers
with taste discrimination from the market. However, the claim that competition necessarily
eliminates discrimination is often overstated. Even Becker clarified conditions under which
employer discrimination could persist, and subsequent theoretical work further under-
mined the claim that competition necessarily has to undermine employer discrimination
(Goldberg 1982; Black 1995).
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Allagainst finding age discrimination in hiring (the opposite direction from
the bias from using low experience for older applicants).Overall Assessment of Challenges in AC Studies
of Age Discrimination in HiringThe considerations discussed in this section pose the following central
question: If we send out resumes for older and younger job applicants
and observe a difference in callbacks (including the innovations just dis-
cussed), are we confident that a difference in callbacks provides evidence
of discrimination that is as convincing as what we would get from a study
of, say, racial discrimination? Our answer to this question is “confident,
but not quite as confident.” There are serious challenges to using AC
methods to study age discrimination. The problems are not unique, how-
ever, to the application of these methods to age discrimination, although
some could bemore severe in this context. The approaches we take in this
paper to adapting AC methods to study age discrimination are meant to
mitigate these problems, and we think they do so substantially, with the
end result being evidence on age discrimination that is compelling—even
if, as always in empirical economics, we cannot definitively rule out all
other explanations of the evidence.IV. The Experimental Design
A. Basic FrameworkThe core analysis uses probit models for callbacks (T ) as a function of
dummy variables for age (M for middle-aged and S for older/senior)
and observables (from the resumes) X I. The latent variable model is20
Ti 5 a 1 bMi 1 gSi 1 X
I
iId 1 εi: (7)
The residual ε includes the unobservable worker characteristics, X II. In
this basic model, the null hypothesis of no discrimination implies that
b 5 0 (for middle-aged workers) and g 5 0 (for older workers). We col-
lect data for multiple occupations and for male and female applicants.
The simple framework is modified in two ways to address the central
challenges in applying AC methods to age discrimination: the treatment
of experience and different variances of the unobservables. We next ex-
plain these modifications and then discuss other features of the study de-
sign, some of which help address other potential challenges to studying
age discrimination in a correspondence study.20 The preceding discussion referred only to younger and older applicants, but the in-
clusion of middle-aged applicants follows naturally.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 935B. Using Experience Commensurate with AgeIn our view, for both policy and legal reasons, the right comparison for
measuring age discrimination is between younger applicants and older
applicants who have experience commensurate with their age. The policy
debate has focused on whether typical older workers who lose their jobs
have difficulty gettinghired because of their age. For example, discussions
of age discrimination and long unemployment durations faced by older
workers during the Great Recession did not consider hypothetical older
job applicants who have not worked much and hence have experience
equal to that of younger applicants; rather, they focused on actual older
job applicants who do have much more experience.21 And evidence of age
differences in callbacks using experience commensurate with age, rather
than equal experience, is more consonant with legal standards for age dis-
crimination.TheADEAmakes it unlawful for employers to fail or refuse to
hire an individual because of that person’s age, with no mention of com-
parisons using equal experience. In addition, a prima facie case for age
discrimination requires evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for the
job but was not hired and the defendant did not hire the plaintiff yet con-
tinued to seek applicants with the plaintiff’s qualifications, in which case
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory
explanation (a “reasonable factor other than age,” or RFOA).22 Establish-
ing an RFOAwould almost surely be easier for an older applicant with un-
usually low experience.
Therefore, we redefine the resume controls in equation (6) to allow
experience to differ with age. Denoting by ES and EY experience “com-
mensurate” with the age of older and younger applicants, respectively, but
matching on all other resume characteristics, the identifying assumption
becomes
EðP jS 5 1, X I, ESÞ 5 EðP jS 5 0, X I, EY Þ: (8)
Of course, one could argue that giving older workers experience com-
mensurate with age leads to an understatement of discrimination, if in fact
this is not representative of older applicants to the jobs we study (i.e., if
we created unusually experienced older applicants). However, we present
evidence below that such resumes are in fact more representative. More-
over, we explore the sensitivity of the results to using low versus commen-




22 See http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/adea.cfm,McDonnell Douglas v. Green (411U.S.
at 792–793, 1973), and http://www1.eeoc.gov//laws/regulations/adea_rfoa_qa_final_rule
.cfm?renderforprint51.
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AllWe expand equation (7) to include comparisons between young appli-
cants with typical low experience (YL), middle-aged or older applicants
with low experience (ML and SL), andmiddle-aged or older applicants with
experience commensurate with their age (MH and SH). If low-experience
resumes send a negative signal, we expect less evidence of discrimina-
tion in comparing outcomes between young applicants andmiddle-aged
or older applicants with commensurate experience—comparisons we be-
lieve are more relevant to assessing whether there is age discrimination
in hiring.C. Correcting for Biases from Differences in the Variance
of UnobservablesWe also implement the solution proposed in Neumark (2012) to address
the Heckman critique. This method is based on a structural model result-
ing from the assumption, noted above, that the callback decision is deter-
mined by a threshold model, as employers try to assess whether an ap-
plicant’s productivity likely exceeds a given threshold (as in the original
critique). The solution imposes an additional identifying assumption to
identify the structural parameter measuring discrimination in hiring (e.g.,
g in eq. [7]), distinguishing between what is typically viewed as discrimi-
nation (stemming from taste or statistical discrimination) and different
treatment stemming from differences in variances of the unobservables.
The details are provided in Neumark (2012); here we discuss the ideas
underlying the approach, some potential issues, and implementation. To
see the intuition behind the solution, recall that in a probit model, all
that is identified is the ratio of the coefficient in the latent variable model
to the standard deviation of the unobservable. Consider estimating the
model only for the young and old groups of applicants. If we are willing
to assume that d in equation (7) is the same for younger and older appli-
cants, then we can identify the ratio jS II=jY II from the ratios of probit co-
efficients for younger and older applicants.23 Thus, information from a
correspondence study on how variation in observable qualifications is re-
lated to callback outcomes can be informative about the relative variance
of the unobservables, and this, in turn, solves the problem of identifying
the effect of discrimination that the Heckman critique highlights.
The parameters are estimated using a heteroskedastic probit model
with variance differing between younger and older applicants, but at least
one element of d—the coefficients on X I in the latent variable model like23 Think about the standard statistical discrimination framework in which an employer
puts less weight on an observable signal of productivity the less reliable it is; in the limiting
case of an infinite variance of the unobservable, e.g., the employer puts zero weight on the
observable signal.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 937equation (7)—restricted to be equal. With data onmultiple productivity-
related characteristics in X I, there is an overidentifying restriction that
the older/younger ratios of coefficients on any element of this vector
are equal (to the same jS II=jY II). Themethod therefore also requires that
some applicant characteristics in X I affect the callback probability (since
if all the effects are zero, we cannot learn about jS II=jY II from these coef-
ficient estimates). AC studies typically do not try to include variables that
shift the callback probability, but instead create one “type” of applicant
for which there is only random variation in characteristics that are not
intended to affect outcomes. However, we build this information into the
study design, through assignment of random elements of a skill vector to
some resumes. Note that the additional variables we add to the resume that
are intended to shift the callback probability are by no means intended
to fully capture the unobservables that—if their variances differ across
age groups—can create bias. Regardless of what a resume says, even if it
went beyond a normal resume, it would not convey reliable information
onmany characteristics employers might care about—such as those often
characterized as “noncognitive skills” (e.g.,Heckman andRubinstein 2001).
The characteristics we add are those that might be expected to shift the
probability of a callback and hence provide information to identify the
heteroskedastic probit model in the face of a difference in the variance
of unobservables. And, indeed, as explained below, we do not add resume
characteristics that are unusual for resumes; rather, we build systematic var-
iation in conventional resume characteristics into the resumes we send out.D. Resume CreationThe core of a correspondence study is the bank of resumes created for the
artificial job applicants.24 Three goals drove our resume creation. First, we
wanted the resumes to be as realistic as possible, so our results are exter-
nally valid for actual job applicants. Second, we wanted valid comparisons
of older and younger applicants—in part along the lines already discussed.
In pursuing these goals, our overarching strategy was to use empirical
evidence whenever possible in making decisions about creating the re-
sumes, to minimize decisions that might limit the external or “compari-
son” validity of the results. In many cases, this empirical evidence came
from a large sample of publicly available resumes we downloaded from
a popular national job-hunting website. This website hasmassive numbers
of resumes—from thousands to hundreds of thousands in large cities in
the jobs we targeted. We downloaded a sample of over 25,000 resumes,24 The online appendix provides much more detail on the creation of resumes than we
provide in this section. Readers interested in many of the “nuts and bolts” of the experi-
mental design may find the online appendix especially useful.
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Allwhich we then scraped for a variety of types of information that we use in
our resume design decisions.25 In addition, we used other data to inform
many of our decisions.Basic ParametersPast studies have tended to use workers near age 30 as the younger group
andworkers near age 50 as the older group.26We include similar age ranges
(29–31 and 49–51). But we focus on an older age range (64–66), which
is of particular interest in light of policy efforts to induce those near retire-
ment age to work longer. We convey age, on the resumes, via high school
graduation year. This is common; in our sample of scraped resumes,
81 percent provide information on high school attendance, and of these
68 percent (56 percent of the total) include high school graduation year.
Given these age ranges, we chose commonnames (by sex, for first names)
for the corresponding cohorts based on data from the Social Security Ad-
ministration. To focus on age, we chose first and last names that weremost
likely to signal that the applicant was Caucasian.
AC studies almost always target a subset of jobs to which the resumes are
tailored, rather than trying to write generic resumes and applying to a
wide variety of jobs. They also generally target fairly low-skill jobs to make
it unlikely that candidates or their work histories are known to recruiters.
Among these types of jobs, we selected a subset in which there were some
low-tenure older workers as well as low-tenure younger workers. Using
jobs in which it is less unusual for older workers to apply increases the re-
alism of the resumes, although it potentially excludes jobs with the stron-
gest age discrimination. We put less weight on the second issue because
the real effects of age likely preclude older workers from applying for cer-
tain jobs.27 If anything, this might generate some bias in our study against
finding age discrimination.
We used Current Population Survey (CPS) Tenure Supplement data
to identify jobs that are common and have a relatively high representa-
tion of older workers with low tenure (5 years or less): retail salespersons,
cashiers, janitors and building cleaners, and security guards, for men; and
retail salespersons, cashiers, secretaries and administrative assistants, office
clerks, receptionists and information clerks, and file clerks, for women.
(So only sales jobs gotmale and female applicants.) Table 1 shows the per-25 In each occupation and city used in our study, we searched for resumes in three ex-
perience groups (3–5 years, 6–10 years, or 101 years), extracting the greater of all resumes
listed or 1,000 resumes, for a total of 25,460 resumes.
26 The younger age range is chosen to capture applicants who are relatively young, but
with enough experience to convey an informative job history to employers that can be com-
pared with job histories of older applicants.
27 For example, National Football League teams do not hire 60-year-old quarterbacks,
no matter how good their past performance.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 939centages of “recent hires” in these occupations in older (62–70) and youn-
ger (28–32) age ranges, relative to all workers in these occupations. We
combined these occupations into four groupings of jobs that best capture
these occupations on the job search website we use: retail sales (retail
salespersons and cashiers), administrative assistant (secretaries and ad-
ministrative assistants, receptionists and information clerks, office clerks,
and file clerks), janitors ( janitors and building cleaners), and security
guards (security guards and gaming surveillance officers).
Although our study was not meant to provide representative evidence
on all older job seekers, the jobs we target are fairly important for hiring
of older workers. From CPS data, for the jobs to which we send male ap-
plicants, among 62–70-year-olds, recent hires in janitor jobs are 2.16 per-
cent of all recent hires; the corresponding figures for security and retail
occupations are 1.00 percent and 2.09 percent. For female applicants, re-
cent hires in administrative occupations are 11.57 percent of all hires of
62–70-year-olds and 3.77 percent in retail.28 Thus, the jobs that we target
capture appreciable shares of new hiring of older workers.29 Moreover, all
of the jobs we target are in the upper tier (andmost are in the top decile)TABLE 1
Percentages of Recent Hires (<5 Years of Tenure) in Age Group Relative
to All Hires in Occupation, 2008 and 2012 CPS Tenure Supplements
Occupation
Age-Specific Recent Hires/
All Recent Hires in Occupation
Ages 62–70 Ages 28–32
A. Males
Average across all occupations 10.79 9.11
Janitors and building cleaners 11.91 2.64
Retail salespersons 11.31 7.55
Security guards and gaming surveillance officers 16.32 8.57
Cashiers 12.62 11.33
B. Females
Average across all occupations 10.98 7.48
Secretaries and administrative assistants 13.18 3.39
Office clerks, general 10.70 4.34
Retail salespersons 12.35 4.65
Receptionists and information clerks 14.55 6.83
Cashiers 15.60 4.59
File clerks 16.00 5.8628 These calculations differ from those in table 1,
in the occupation in specific age ranges.
29 As additional evidence, Rutledge, Sass, and Ram
of older (50–64) to prime-age (30–49) hires in deta
rity (guards, watchmen, doorkeepers, and protect
1996–2012 CPS data. They also report that the job
hired are much narrower for less educated workers
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Allof jobs in terms of the proportions of older people hired. Looking at the
distribution of the share of 62–70-year-olds hired recently (tenure less
than 5 years) across all occupations, the percentiles for males in the oc-
cupations we use are 98.4 for janitors, 96.6 for retail salespersons, 93.3
for security guards and gaming surveillance officers, and 83.9 for cash-
iers. The percentiles for females are 100 for secretaries and administra-
tive assistants, 96.8 for cashiers, 96.4 for receptionists and information
clerks, 95.2 for retail salespersons, 93.6 for office clerks, general, and
85.6 for file clerks.
Examination of our scraped resumes justified the decision to tailor re-
sumes to these specific jobs.We examined the persistence of careers within
the occupations we study, using phrases that appear to cover the same jobs
(e.g., for administrative assistant: administrative, receptionist, office man-
ager, file manager, file clerk, or secretary). Across resumes, for each type
of job included in the study, about one-third (between 29 and 32 percent)
of all jobs were in the same job as the current job for which the person was
seekingwork.30We also examined the resumedatabase for older applicants
in these jobs. Figure 1 displays the age distribution of resumes in each of
the four jobs we study and shows a nonnegligible representation of older
resumes.31
Because low-skill workers have low geographicmobility (Molloy, Smith,
and Wozniak 2011), we also target the resumes to jobs in specific cities,
with the job and education history on each resumematching the city from
which the job ad to which we apply originates. Whereas some studies use
only oneor two cities (Bendick et al. 1999; Lahey 2008), we chose a broader
geographic scope to increase external validity.We alsomade sure our cities
varied on other dimensions that might affect hiring of older workers in-
cluding variation in state age discrimination laws (see Neumark and Song
2013) and in age composition of the population. Table 2 lists the cities in
our study, classified by these characteristics.Job HistoriesTo construct job histories for the resumes, we pooled job titles and descrip-
tions from the actual resumes to create a set of entries, with only minor
changes tomakephrasing, grammar, and so forth consistent.We then ran-30 These are probably lower bounds, because we likely cannot classify all job titles as fall-
ing within covered jobs.
31 Because we were more likely to cut off the number of resumes extracted at 1,000 for
lower-experience cells, there is likely a bias toward older resumes in these histograms. Off-
setting this, older workers looking for jobs may be less likely to post resumes on such a web-
site than younger workers. However, as documented in the online appendix, CPS supple-
ment data on job search methods do not explicitly identify posting resumes on a website,
but they otherwise indicate little difference between job search methods by age.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 941domly combined these job entries to create job histories for each of the
types of jobs in the study, using a combination of subjective judgment as
to what annual job ending probability generated job histories most like
those on thedownloaded resumes, and secondary data from the JobOpen-This content downloaded from 154.059.124.102 on April 20, 2020 08:32:58 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchic-
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TABLE 2
Cities in Study, by Percentage of Population Aged 621,
and Age Discrimination Laws
Stronger Laws (Larger Damages) Weaker Laws (Smaller Damages)
Much older cities Sarasota (34.7%, 15)
Older cities Miami (19.6%, 15) Pittsburgh (21.7%, 4)
Mixed cities New York (16.9%, 4), Boston
(17.4%, 6), Chicago (15.2%, 15)
Charlotte (15.1%, 15), Phoenix
(16.3%, 15), Birmingham (17.6%,
20)
Younger cities Houston (12.1%, 15),
Los Angeles (14.3%, 5)
Salt Lake City (11.6%, 15)Note.—The first number in parentheses is the percentage of the population aged 62 and
over, based on 2012 AmericanCommunity Survey 5-year files. The second number in paren
theses is the firm-size cutoff for applicability of the state age discrimination law; the ADEA
cutoff is 20. Larger damages refers to more damages being available under state law com
pared to the ADEA. Nationally, 16.3 percent of the population is aged 621.FIG. 1.—Histograms of resumes by age, resume website. Based on the sample of resumes
extracted from a resume-posting website, as described in the text. The percentages of ob-
servations for ages 62–70 for each job are administrative, 0.73 percent; janitor, 0.49 per-
cent; sales, 0.13 percent; and security, 0.34 percent. Color version available as an online
enhancement.ago.edu/t-and-c).
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Allings and Labor Turnover Survey to mimic the actual monthly pattern of
job changes.
We used these to create three job histories for each city and type of job.
Eachhistory goes back to 1970with an essentially continuous work history,
aside from job turnover and short spells of unemployment as explained
below. To create the job histories of younger applicants, as well as older
applicants reporting low experience, we simply truncate the job histories
at the appropriate year. For the younger applicants and the middle-aged
and older applicants with experience commensurate with age, the job his-
tory begins just after the school-leaving age. Thus, the parts of the job his-
tories that overlap all resumes regardless of age or experience look sim-
ilar across all resumes. We randomly distinguish resumes on the basis of
whether applicants are currently unemployed (with 50 percent probabil-
ity), with all applicants within each triplet of resumes sent to an employer
(described below) as either employed (recent job end date listed as “pres-
ent”) or unemployed.32
We modified some resumes to learn about potential differences in age
discrimination for workers moving into lower-skilled “bridge” jobs. This
bridging was reflected on many of the resumes we examined for admin-
istrative, sales, and security jobs (but not janitors), which sometimes
showed a progression from lower-level to higher-level jobs, and some-
times also (for the oldest workers) a clear downshift toward low-level jobs
8–10 years prior to the end of the job history. Thus, for the administra-
tive, sales, and security resumes, we modified some of the resumes for
the middle-aged and oldest applicants to first show rising skill levels
and then bridging to lower-skill jobs: for the oldest applicants reflecting
the two alternative patterns of bridging and for the middle-aged appli-
cants only the concurrent downshift.
We already defined low- and high-experience resumes for middle-aged
and older applicants (ML, MH, SL, and SH). For middle-aged workers, the
notation to further classify bridge/nonbridge resumes is ML, MHB, and
MHNB, with B and NB denoting bridge and nonbridge. For older workers,
the resumes are denoted SL, SHB
E , SHB
L, and SHNB; the E and L superscripts
indicate whether the transition to the bridge job occurs early (years be-
fore the current application) or late (contemporaneously with the current
application). The low-experience and nonbridge resumes always keep ap-
plicants at low skill levels, while the bridge resumes have rising skill levels
until the bridging occurs.3332 When applicants are unemployed, the resumes indicate that their last job ended in
the month prior to the job application. During the course of the field experiment, every
month we moved the ending date of the most recent job forward 1 month, so that unem-
ployment durations did not lengthen during the time the experiment was in the field.
33 The online appendix gives more information on the construction of the bridge re-
sumes and what they look like.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 943We added employer names and addresses manually to each job on our
final job histories to match the cities in which we were applying for jobs.
We ensured that the job title and description were realistic for the em-
ployer. In addition, we used employers that were active at the time and
in the region listed, relying mainly on the actual resumes, supplemented
by additional research on chains. In some cases, we added as employers
large public or private institutions known tobe open in a particular period.
The employer names were assigned randomly.
With regard to one of the central issues regarding the job histories, we
calculated experience on the downloaded resumes, based on the number
of years worked. It is clear that a large share of resumes of older applicants
list job experience that is commensurate with their age, including jobs
going all the way back to the 1970s and even the 1960s for those who were
old enough, and that experience commensurate with age is more repre-
sentative of the resumes we studied.34 This is reflected in figure 2, which
plots average experience by age: overall in panel A and by job in panel B.
Both panels indicate that, on average, reported experience on the re-
sumes rises approximately linearly with age.35SkillsTo address the Heckman critique, we designate half the resume triplets
sent out to be high-skilled and half to be low-skilled. We choose both gen-
eral and occupation-specific skills for the jobs for which we apply, based
on the downloaded resumes. For each type of high-skill resume, there are
seven possible skills, five of which are chosen randomly (so that they are
not perfectly collinear within a job). The five general skills that apply to
all jobs are a college degree (bachelor of arts for sales, administrative as-
sistant, and security guards, and associate of arts for janitors); fluency in
Spanish as a second language; an “employee of the month” award on the
most recent job; one of three volunteer activities (foodbank, homeless shel-
ter, or animal shelter); and an absence of typographical errors. Two skills
are specific to each occupation: for administrative/secretarial jobs, typing
45, 50, or 55 words per minute and facility with relevant computer soft-
ware (a randomly chosen mix of Quickbooks, Microsoft Office, and in-
ventory management software); for retail/cashier jobs, Microsoft Office
and programs used to monitor inventory (VendPOS, AmberPOS, and34 There was, in particular, no indication that older job applicants limited reported work
experience to 10 years.
35 While resumes for older workers did not always feature a complete job history indicat-
ing near-continuous work, there was no consistent way in which older workers explained
gaps when they existed.
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AllFIG. 2.—Age and experience in the resume sample. A, Overall averages by age. B, By job.
Based on the sample of resumes from a resume-posting website, as described in the text. In
the individual-level data, the correlation between age and computed experience is .77. If
there are multiple jobs held at the same time, experience is not double-counted. Color ver-
sion available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 154.059.124.102 on April 20, 2020 08:32:58 AM
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 945Lightspeed), and the ability to learnnew programs; for security jobs, a state
license and CPR training; and for janitor jobs, a certificate in using partic-
ular machines and certification in janitorial and cleaning sciences.Additional Resume ElementsThere are a number of additional resume elements that we added. Resi-
dential addresses were selected to be realistic for both older and younger
applicants and the jobs to which we were applying and to avoid signaling
a race other than white or other positive or negative information about
the applicants. The addresses were randomly assigned with respect to age,
so there is no association between socioeconomic status of the neighbor-
hood and age of applicant.
We randomly assign one of three high schools, and colleges and univer-
sities for the high-skilled resumes, for each city, to each applicant in our
triplet. We use local schools, colleges, and universities that were in opera-
tion since 1960 so that there is no possibility that an applicant attended a
school that was not operational at the time. We avoided top-tier/flagship
universities whenever possible.E. Resume TripletsAfter creating the final resumes, we combined them into triplets that go
out in response to each job for which we apply. The resumes in a triplet
are differentiated by age and, for the middle-aged and older applicants,
whether they show low or commensurate experience and by the different
types of bridge resumes. For age, we sent a triplet consisting of a young
applicant and either (1) two older applicants, (2) two middle-aged appli-
cants, or (3) one older applicant and one middle-aged applicant, chosen
randomly with probability one-third each. For themiddle-aged or older ap-
plicants, we also randomly assigned resume type (by experience and bridg-
ing): in cases 1 and 2 we sample without replacement two resumes from
either the middle-aged or the older resumes, and in case 3 we sample ran-
domly one middle-aged and one older resume. The triplets are also dif-
ferentiated by sex, chosen randomly for each city and day of the month.36
Other features, including resume templates, were randomly and uniquely
assigned to each resume in a triplet to ensure that the applicants were dis-36 There are two exceptions. First, for sales jobs in one city (New York), a coding error in
the triplet randomization generated an excessive share of resume triplets with two older ap-
plicants (with early bridge and late bridge job histories). Second, janitors do not get bridge
resumes, so we always assigned a middle-age and old resume to each triplet, randomly sam-
pling from thehigh- or low-experience resumes. Age is always assigned randomlywith respect
to other resume characteristics.
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Alltinguished from each other and that any other resume characteristics
were distributed randomly across the three applicants in each triplet.37F. Applying for JobsWe identified jobs to apply for using a common job-posting website. Re-
search assistants read the postsmultiple days per week over approximately
5months of data collection, using a detailed protocol to select jobs for the
study. Jobs had to be entry level (e.g., not managers or supervisors) in the
correct occupations, and the ads couldnot require in-person applications,
inquiries by phone, or application on an external website. The ads could
not require additional documents we had not prepared (e.g., a salary his-
tory) or skills that our resumes did not have. Other exclusion criteria and
quality control for the selection of ads are described in the online appen-
dix. Once a job to apply for was identified, research assistants applied for
thejobs using the randomly assigned triplet.Within each triplet, the order
of applications was randomized with respect to age, with the resumes gen-
erally sent over three consecutive days. We sent triplets of applications in
response to 13,371 unique job ads.G. Sample SizeIn an experiment, it is important not to continue to collect data until the
estimateddifferences become statistically significant. The plan in our original
proposal was to have three types of resumes—young, old low-experience,
and old high-experience—with a target sample size of 11,520 observations
calibrated to detect as significant estimated callback differentials similar
to those in past studies. Commissioned reviewers of our design protocol
suggested expanding to the eight different resumes used in the study, add-
ing the threemiddle-aged resumes, and splitting the older, high-experience
resumes into three groups based on bridging behavior. With eight groups
instead of three, this implies a desired sample size of 30,720 (11,520 
8/3). However, we also decided ex ante to keep our research assistants
for the job application process working through the end of the last aca-
demic quarter for which they were hired in which the target sample size
was reached, which resulted in applications to just over 40,000 jobs.3837 These characteristics included first and last names, school names, addresses, phone
numbers, email address formats and domains, cover letter style, and the language describ-
ing jobs and skills. The online appendix provides resume prototypes that display all the
dimensions of variation.
38 We did not file a pre-analysis plan because the analysis in these studies is standard, en-
tailing testing for differences (by age, in our case) with no controls, and verifying that results
are robust to including controls (as expected, given the randomization). We did specify in
advance—in a research protocol presented in seminars and for which we commissioned re-
views—that wewoulddo the analysis byoccupation, pooled across occupations, and separately
by sex; the last dated version of this protocol, written before any data were analyzed and while
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 947H. Collecting ResponsesPhone numbers and email addresses are included on the resumes, so re-
sponses could be received by email or by phone. All responses were for-
warded to a central email account, with voicemails arriving as attachments
that included the phone number of the firm calling and the phone num-
ber on the resume. We had a unique match between the email sent in ap-
plying for a job and the email response if the employer sent a direct email
reply, which was typical. However, sometimes employers responded in a
separate email. Phone responses are more difficult to match to applica-
tions. We purchased 360 online phone numbers, enough to assign any in-
coming call to a unique resume type defined by all of the characteristics by
which resumes are distinguished, and used an automated voice mail mes-
sage to instruct callers to include their name and their number in their
message.39 Members of the research team listened to each voice mail to
record the response and glean information to match phone responses
to specific job ads, which wasmademuch easier since they could be linked
to resumes and we knew which resume went to each ad and had other in-
formation recorded from the job application process. A similar (simpler)
process was used for email responses directly to applicants. In a small num-
ber of cases (about 200), we could not match the response to any resume.
These cases are dropped because without the resume match we do not
know the values for the resume control variables.
Each response was coded as an unambiguous positive response (e.g.,
“Please call to set up an interview”), an ambiguous response (e.g., “Please
return our call, we have a few additional questions”), or an unambiguous
negative response (e.g., “Thank you for your interest, but the job has been
filled”). To avoid having to classify the ambiguous responses subjectively,
they were treated as callbacks (6.6 percent of the total coded as call-
backs);40 the negative responses were treated the same as no callbacks.
Table 3 reports the matching of responses by voice mail and email to job
identifiers or resumes. Even thoughmost responses can be matched to job
IDs, we want to make use of all the data. Furthermore, no information be-
yond that on the resumes is used for the analysis. Thus, wemakeuse of all of
these data, and we cluster at the resume level in our statistical estimation.
Nonetheless, there may also be random influences at the level of the
job ad, so it is of interest to ask how the standard errors (and hence our39 Every resume with the same phone number has a unique first and last name, and all
phone responses used a name, so we can always match to the resume.
40 Results were very similar if we omitted the small percentage of ambiguous responses.
data collection was ongoing, was March 19, 2015. The analysis of bias fromdifferent variances
of the unobservables is potentially a sequential procedure—involving the specification of
skills in the heteroskedastic probit estimation so as not to reject the overidentifying restric-
tions—and hence could not be further prespecified. As it turned out, we did not reject
overidentifying tests, so we report initial analyses with no specification searching.
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Allinferences) are affected by clustering at the job ad level as well. This re-
quires multiway clustering (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011), given
that the same resume could be sent to different job ads. The problem with
this latter analysis is that we cannotmatch all responses perfectly to job ads,
as table 3 shows. It is undesirable to simply discard the observations that
cannot be matched to job ads, because this is not random; all the observa-
tions for which we canmatch to the resume but not the job ad are positive
responses (14 percent of our positive responses, as shown in table 3).
Moreover, we cannot drop from the sample the other applications that
went to the same job ad, for which we received no response, implying that
dropping only the positive responses from a triplet generates a bias to-
ward finding no effect of age on callbacks. The potential concern is that
by clustering at the level of the resume rather than the job ad, we under-
state the standard errors. However, we show in the online appendix that,
for the subsample for which we can match to job ads, the standard errors
(and hence statistical inferences) are not changed by clustering at the re-
sume rather than the job ad level.V. Results
A. Basic Callback RatesTable 4 reports raw differences in callback rates for the four occupations
combined and for each occupation separately (separating sales by sex).
We report statistical tests of whether callback rates are independent of
age for all three-way and two-way comparisons. Combining all four occu-
pations, in panel A we find strong overall evidence of age discrimination,
with callback rates statistically significantly lower by about 18 percent for
middle-aged workers and about 35 percent for older workers. For the
three-way and two-way tests of independence we strongly reject indepen-
dence of applicant age and callback rates.41TABLE 3
Level of Matching of Callbacks
Matched Callback Responses
No Responses TotalJob ID Match Resume Match Only
Voice mail 2,495 765 NA 3,260
Email 2,822 97 NA 2,919
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 949For administrative jobs (panel B), for which we found by far the most
eligible ads (about 61 percent of the total), the callback rate is 14.4 per-
cent for young applicants aged 29–31. It is about 29 percent lower for
49–51-year-old applicants (10.3 percent) and about 47 percent lower for
64–66-year-old applicants (7.6 percent). Again, for every comparison weTABLE 4
Callback Rates by Age
Young (29–31) Middle (49–51) Old (64–66)
A. Combined (N 5 40,223)
Callback (%) No 81.31 84.60 87.84
Yes 18.69 15.40 12.16








(p -value) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
B. Administrative (N 5 24,350, Females)
Callback (%) No 85.59 89.70 92.42
Yes 14.41 10.30 7.58








(p -value) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
C. Sales (N 5 5,348, Males)
Callback (%) No 79.11 78.81 85.30
Yes 20.89 21.09 14.70








(p -value) (.00) (.90) (.00) (.00)
D. Sales (N 5 4,707, Females)
Callback (%) No 71.32 74.13 81.57
Yes 28.68 25.87 18.43








(p -value) (.00) (.11) (.00) (.00)
E. Security (N 5 4,138, Males)
Callback (%) No 75.72 78.45 78.26
Yes 24.28 21.55 21.74








(p -value) (.16) (.09) (.12) (.93)
F. Janitors (N 5 1,680, Males)
Callback (%) No 67.92 66.55 74.11
Yes 32.08 33.45 25.89








(p -value) (.01) (.66) (.03) (.01)This conten
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Allstrongly reject the hypothesis that age of applicant and callback rates are
independent.
Thenext-largest number of applications was in sales. Formales (panelC),
callback rates for middle-aged versus young applicants were not very dif-
ferent. But the callback rate for older applicants was 30 percent lower:
14.7 percent versus 20.9 percent for young applicants. And the differences
between young and old (as well as middle-aged and old) applicants are
strongly statistically significant. For female sales applicants (panel D),
the callback rate for middle-aged applicants is lower than for younger ap-
plicants (25.9 vs. 28.7 percent), although only marginally significant (p -
value5 .11). The callback differential between old and young applicants
is larger (over 10 percentage points). Thus, there is evidence of stronger
age discrimination for women than for men in sales.42
There were far fewer ads to apply to for security (around 4,100) and
janitor (around 1,700) jobs. For security jobs (panel E), the data indicate
roughly equal callback rates formiddle-aged and older applicants (around
21.5 percent). Both are lower than the callback rate for younger applicants
(24.3 percent), with p -values of .09 and .12. For janitor jobs (panel F), the
callback rate was slightly higher formiddle-aged than for younger workers.
But the callback rate was significantly lower for older applicants (25.9 per-
cent), providing statistically significant evidence of discrimination against
the oldest applicants.
What does our evidence imply for hiring opportunities for older work-
ers? There are two key issues. First, our evidence directly pertains only to
the occupations for which we have data and can only be suggestive about
the full set of jobs to which older workers might apply. Nonetheless, three
conclusions seem fair: (1) the distribution of ads to which we applied is
to some extent representative of hiring opportunities for older workers,
at least in this set of jobs and on the job-listing website we used; (2) the
large number of administrative job ads, coupled with the sex composition
of new, olderhires in this occupation, suggests that our results speakmore
to hiring of older women than of older men; and (3) most important, at
least for the jobs we study, the evidence of age discrimination in hiring is
stronger for women, as it is stronger in the female than in the male jobs
and for women in the mixed job (sales).
Second, there is a question of what evidence on callbacks tells us about
hiring. The literal meaning of the evidence—and how it is usually inter-
preted (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004)—is that a group that ex-
periences a lower callback rate has to apply to more jobs to receive a call-
back.However, we believe that differences in callbacks are likely to translate
quite closely into differences in job offers. A priori, an employer is more42 Note that the callback rates at all ages are higher for women than for men. Similarly,
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) did not find discrimination against women in retail.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 951likely to discriminate at the pre-interview (callback) stage than at the inter-
view ( job offer) stage. Because company personnel systems often create
data records for those interviewed, discrimination in offering jobs to ap-
plicants may be much easier to detect than discrimination in deciding
whom to call back for an interview. Indeed, there is evidence to support
this presumption. The Bendick et al. (1999) audit study of age discrimina-
tion captured differences in outcomes at different stages of the applica-
tion process and found that three-quarters of the overall discriminatory
difference in treatment occurred at the pre-interview stage. Studies of eth-
nic discrimination by the International Labor Organization, discussed in
Riach and Rich (2002), provide estimates of differences at the selection
for interview stage and the job offer stage and find that around 90 percent
of the discrimination that is detected occurs at the selection for interview
stage. AndNeumark (1996) finds similar evidence in an audit study of sex
discrimination that also included a callback stage.
Finally, in line with the earlier discussion of what the evidence can tell
us about the likelihood of older workers finding a match, the basic job
search model with a constant reservation wage strategy derives the aver-
age duration of unemployment as inversely proportional to the job offer
rate and directly proportional to the hazard rate for exiting unemploy-
ment (Cahuc, Carcillo, and Zylberberg 2014, 264).43 Thus, all else the
same, the 35 percent lower callback rate for older versus younger appli-
cants in panel A would imply about 54 percent longer unemployment du-
rations. Of course in reality, older applicants might adjust in a way that
would lower their unemployment durations. Nonetheless, this crude es-
timate corresponds closely to CPS data on unemployment durations (for
incomplete spells). In 2014 (when our data were collected), the ratio of
average duration for 55–64-year-olds versus 25–34-year-olds was 1.48, and
the ratio for 651 versus 25–34 was 1.59.44B. Multivariate Estimates for Young, Middle-Aged,
and Old ApplicantsIn table 5, we report results of probit estimates for callbacks (showingmar-
ginal effects). In each case, we first report results with controls for the city,
the order in which applications were submitted, current employment/un-
employment, and skills. We then add controls for an extensive set of re-
sume features listed in the table note. The combined specifications also
include controls for occupation and sex. In general, the random assign-
ment of group membership to resumes in AC studies implies that the con-
trols should not affect the estimated differences associated with group43 In both cases, the job offer arrival rate is multiplied by the probability that the job of-
fer exceeds the constant reservation wage.
44 See https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2014/cpsaat31.pdf.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 953membership. This does not necessarily apply to AC studies of age discrimi-
nation, because of the issue of conditioningon experience (andbecause, in
our study, the older resumes vary in terms of both experience and bridge
jobs). Nonetheless, the estimates in table 5 are quite similar to those in ta-
ble 4. For the larger samples (all jobs combined and administrative jobs)
the estimated differentials are nearly identical to those in table 4, and for
the smaller samples (the remaining jobs) the estimates are similar.45
Table 5 echoes table 4 in pointing to unambiguous evidence of age dis-
crimination for female job applicants, for both themiddle-aged and older
groups. For males the evidence is less clear; we never find statistically sig-
nificant evidence of age discrimination for themiddle-aged relative to the
younger applicants, and the evidence for older applicants is weaker—with
smaller estimated differentials in sales and only marginally significant ev-
idence in security.C. A Richer Characterization of Resume TypesWe next turn to models incorporating all of the resume types, expanding
equation (7) to be46
Ti 5 a 1 bLML,i 1 bHBMHB,i 1 bHNBMHNB,i






,i 1 gHNBSHNB,i 1 XiId 1 εi :
(9)
We use this model to compare the findings for older versus younger ap-
plicants depending on whether the resumes for the older applicants show
the same low experience as the younger resumes or instead experience
that is commensurate with age. To do this, we test the equality of age dif-
ferences using low-experience and high-experience/nonbridge resumes,
reporting tests for the hypotheses bHNB 5 bL and gHNB 5 gL; the compar-
ison to high-experience/nonbridge resumes is apt because these are the
“conventional” high-experience resumes. Then we test whether the dif-
ferent kinds of bridging to lower-skill jobs matter. Specifically, we test the
hypotheses bHNB 5 bHB , gHNB 5 gHBE , and gHNB 5 gHBL, corresponding to
one test for middle-aged applicants and two for older applicants.
Equation (9) also touches base closely with past AC studies of age dis-
crimination. First, it gives evidence on callback rates for applicants near
50 versus applicants near 30, similar to the age ranges considered in the45 Perhaps not surprisingly given the large sample and differences in parameter estimates
we strongly reject the pooling restrictions implied by combining the results for all occupa
tions. (For this test, because the skill indicators vary by occupation, we simply use thehigh-skil
indicator for themodels for each occupation, andweestimate separatemodels by sex for both
sales and the combined occupations, to avoid non-nested models.)
46 The exception is for janitors, for which we do not construct bridge resumes, and
hence estimate
Ti 5 a 1 bLML,i 1 bHNBMHNB,i 1 gLSL,i 1 gHNBSHNB,i 1 XiId 1 εi :
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Allpast studies. Second, the results for the low-experience resumes (the es-
timates of bL and gL) provide closer comparisons with past work that gave
older and younger applicants the same experience (most notably, Lahey
[2008]).47 Thus, one can view the full model in equation (9) as giving the
study a treatment arm that mimics past studies and treatment arms that
provide evidence from using commensurate experience and from using
bridge resumes.
Our estimates indicate that, with one exception, the results are insensi-
tive to the two types of differences in the career paths of older applicants
indicated on the resumes: equal experience versus experience commensu-
rate with age, andbridge versus nonbridge resumes. For all jobs combined,
all three estimates for middle-aged applicants indicate lower callback rates
than for young applicants, with a small range of estimates (2.7–3.5 percent-
age points lower). All four estimates for older applicants are also strongly
significantly different from zero, indicating lower callback rates than for
young applicants regardless of resume type, with a similarly small range
of estimates. Consistent with the point estimates, panel A of table 6 shows
no significant differences between estimated callback rates for resumes
showing low experience versus experience commensurate with age, for
middle-aged or older applicants, suggesting that low experience on re-
sumes for these applicants does not lead to spurious evidence of age dis-
crimination. Panel B reveals no significant differences in the estimated
effects of resumes showing applicants bridging to a lower-skilled job (MHB
or OHB
L) or already having done so (OHB
E).
The remaining columns of table 6 report results by occupation. Look-
ing at applicants for administrative jobs, sales jobs (male or female), and
security jobs, the conclusions from the key statistical tests are similar. In
almost every case we do not reject hypotheses—whether for middle-aged
and older applicants separately or considered together—that the estimated
effects are equal regardless of experience or for the different bridge or
nonbridge resumes.4847 In addition, our retail and administrative jobs overlap with those in Lahey (2008) and
Riach and Rich (2010).
48 The one exception (in 20 tests), for the restrictionMHNB 5 MHB for male applicants in
sales, is not in the direction of lower callbacks for bridge resumes. One issue discussed in
the online appendix is the treatment of spam responses to our job applications. We re-
tained these observations because we could not be sure we identified all spam responses,
and from the point of view of a job applicant, a spam response is an unproductive response
to a job application. On the other hand, we would expect the retention of these responses to
lead to understating age discrimination, because the spam ads generate null responses
in a manner that should be unrelated to age. Nearly all the spam ads were for administra-
tive assistant jobs, so this issue has no bearing on results for other occupations. For the
analysis discussed here, when we dropped ads we identified as spam, for middle-aged ap-
plicants the statistical evidence of equality of effects for the resumes showing low vs. com-
mensurate experience was stronger, with a p - value of .06. However, the results for older
applicants still did not indicate any difference between low- and high-experience resumes
(p - value 5 .85).
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 955The exception is for janitors. In table 6, we find no evidence of discrim-
ination against older janitor applicants showinghigh experiencebut strong
evidence of discrimination against older janitor applicants reporting low
experience; in this case the callback rate is 9.4 percentage points lower than
for young applicants, significant at the 1 percent level. And the test statistic
(panel A) rejects equality of effects across the two resume types at the 5 per-
cent level for older applicants. Thus, for this occupation, there is arguably
a bias against finding age discrimination from using resumes that do not
report a “full” job history.49
The results for the bridge resumes also provide indirect evidence sug-
gesting that the lower callback rates for older applicants do not reflect sta-
tistical discrimination. One question was whether older applicants show-
ing longer experience at low-level jobs conveyed a negative signal (lower
“speed of success”). In this case, the bridge resumes are useful because
they distinguish older workers whohave, instead, risen to higher job levels
over much of their job history. Thus, the speed-of-success hypothesis would
predict higher callback rates for older applicants with bridge resumes than
with nonbridge resumes (for resumes with commensurate experience);
we find no such evidence.50 Finally, employers might assume that older
women showing low experience had many career interruptions to care
for children.51 We are skeptical that this would matter for low-skill jobs and
resumes showing 10 or more years of recent experience anyway, and the
absence of different effects, for women, of resumes with low versus com-
mensurate experience provides consistent evidence.D. Addressing the Heckman CritiqueFor the analysis of potential biases introduced by differences in the vari-
ances of unobservables, we focus on the sharpest results with arguably49 Although the other point estimates in table 6 sometimes point to lower callbacks for
the low-experience middle-aged or older applicants, this evidence is not consistent or sta-
tistically significant. This suggests that the effect of age outweighs the effects of these ex-
perience differences, possibly because in the kinds of low-skill jobs we study there is not
a lot of human capital accumulation beyond 10 or so years.
50 One might also argue that the absence of differences between bridge and nonbridge
resumes speaks to the question of whether perceived health differences drive lower callback
rates for older applicants. We know that workers sometimes move to bridge jobs/partial re-
tirement because of declining health ( Johnson et al. 2009; Johnson 2014). If the kinds of job
changes associated with bridge resumes are associated with health declines and declining
health is an issue, wemight expect older applicants with bridge resumes to experience lower
callback rates than other older applicants, which we do not find. Of course the bridge re-
sumes cannot speak to expectations about future health declines for older applicants.
51 Our resumes do not show time out for child care, whichmatches actual resumes. In the
resumes we examined for the types of jobs for which we applied, scraping and checking the
resume content revealed that it was very unusual for women’s resumes to provide explicit in-
formation on staying at home to raise children.Well below 1 percent had any such reference,
andmost of these had a reference to pairs of words such as “child” and “provider” that were
more likely to indicate a paid job than staying at home.
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Allthe greatest policy relevance: the differences in outcomes between young
and old (near retirement age) applicants, without regard to the variation
in resume types.52
As a preliminary step, table 7 reports models for callbacks that add in-
teractions between the skill indicators and the dummy variable for older
applicants. Recall that correcting for biases from differences in the vari-
anceof unobservables relies ondifferences (if they exist) between theprobit
coefficient estimates on the skill-related variables for younger and older
applicants. For example, if the unobserved variance is larger for older work-
ers, then for any skill, the interaction should be the opposite sign of the
main skill effect and lower the absolute value of the effect of skill for older
applicants.53 The interactive model reported in table 7 is not needed to
implement the bias correction. That is done using the heteroskedastic
probit model. However, the estimates of the interactive model provide in-
formation on the differences in the coefficients on these skill-related var-
iables that provide the basis for identifying the heteroskedastic probit
model. In addition, the overidentification test concerns the ratios of these
coefficients for each skill-related variable included in the model and is
computed on the basis of the interactive model.54
The estimates in table 7 sometimes give a fairly clear indication of what
to expect from the heteroskedastic probit estimates regarding the rela-
tive variances of the unobservables. In column 1, for all jobs combined,
college significantly predicts hiring, and the interaction points to a smaller52 Implementation of this method in other contexts (e.g., Neumark 2012; Neumark and
Rich 2019) shows that, unsurprisingly, standard errors of the discrimination estimates are
quite a bit larger, so that the bias-corrected estimates for differences between middle-aged
and younger applicants, and between resume types, would likely be uninformative. (This
was confirmed in analyses not reported here implementing the bias correction for middle-
aged vs. younger applicants.)
53 The correct computation of marginal effects for interactions accounts for changes in
each variable in the interactions. Our interest, though, is in the signs and magnitudes of
the underlying probit coefficients on the “old” and the “old-skill” interactions, of which
the marginal effects reported here are approximately rescaled versions.
54 To be clear, returning to eq. (7) and focusing only on the older vs. younger applicants,
we estimate a probit model corresponding to the latent variable model




iI  Sil 1 εi ,
i.e., adding in a full set of interactions between the dummy variable for older applicants
and the skill-related variables in the model (X I). The overidentification restriction tested is
d1= d1 1 l1ð Þ 5 d2= d2 1 l2ð Þ 5 ⋯ 5 dK= dK 1 lKð Þ
for the K element of X I, where subscripts on the parameters indicate the corresponding
elements of d and l. In principle, it would be ideal to estimate a model with all of the
age-skill interactions as a heteroskedastic probit model. However, this led to convergence
problems for some samples, which is not surprising given that it can be hard to distinguish
how age shifts the variance of the error term from a rich set of interactions between age
and the resume elements in the linear index function. For the samples for which the model
did converge, the estimates were very similar to those in table 7 (as were the results of the
overidentification tests reported in table 8, with p-values within .01).
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 959effect for older workers, consistent with a larger variance for them. The
same is true for janitors, for both college and technical skills and volunteer-
ing (although volunteering has an unexpected negative main effect).55
Similarly, for administrative jobs, three of the main skill effects have statis-
tically significant positive effects—college, volunteer, and words per min-
ute—the interactions are negative, and the summed effects for older work-
ers are smaller than themaineffects (in absolute value).However, for these
jobs the effect of computer skills is larger for older applicants.56
For sales workers the evidence is less clear. The skill variables have
weaker effects, and for both male and female applicants the combined
main effects and interactions are often of opposite sign but do not con-
sistently point to smaller absolute effects for older applicants. For security
workers, Spanish strongly predicts hiring, although the interaction sug-
gests a larger effect for older applicants, consistent with a lower variance
of the unobservable for them. For other skills the estimates point to di-
minished effects for older applicants, consistent with a larger variance
of the unobservable for older applicants.
Finally, table 8 turns to the heteroskedastic probit estimates. The first
row of panel B reports the overall effect from the heteroskedastic probit
estimates, which are similar to the probit estimates (panel A).57 Next, we
report the p - value from the overidentification test that the ratios of the
skill coefficients between younger and older workers are equal across
all of the skills (based on the models estimated in table 7). The p -value is
high across all the columns, indicating that we do not reject the overiden-
tifying restrictions.
The third row of panel B reports the estimated ratio of the standard de-
viation of the unobservable for old relative to young applicants. A ratio
different from one can cause bias in the estimate of discrimination. For
all jobs combined, in column 1, the unobservables correction makes lit-
tle difference. The estimated ratio of standard deviations is a bit greater55 The statistical significance of these estimates is not critical. What is critical is that the
skill variables have nonzero effects on callback rates, and how strong these are will influ-
ence how informative the heteroskedastic probit estimates are. Regardless, in models with-
out skill-age interactions, the p - value for the joint test of the skill variables was below .05 for
administrative, security, and janitor jobs but in the .5–.7 range for sales jobs.
56 Note that the positive interaction of computer skills and “old” is consistent with statis-
tical discrimination against older applicants, with employers assuming they have lower
computer skills when computer skills are not listed. However, the age gap is far larger than
this estimate (0.09 vs. 0.034), so this by no means accounts for the age difference. For sales
occupations—where computer skills are also one of the skills we sometimes add—there is
no clear age-skill pattern. In the online appendix we present additional evidence and show
that accounting for this difference in the effects of computer skills in the correction for
bias from different variances of the unobservable does not alter the qualitative conclusions
regarding age discrimination for older applicants either with or without computer skills.
57 The marginal effects are calculated differently from those for the probit estimates in
table 5; see the table note.
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Allthan one (1.09), as table 7 foreshadowed. Similarly, we find evidence of a
higher variance for older applicants for security and janitor jobs. For the
other jobs, the evidence from table 7 was less clear, and the evidence in
table 8 is indeed mixed, with evidence of a larger variance of the unob-
servable for sales jobs (females), but not for administrative jobs or sales
jobs for males. As reported in the following row of the table, however,
there is not always strong statistical evidence against the homoskedastic
model with equal standard deviations, although we reject the restriction
for female sales applicants.58
The last two rows of the table decompose the heteroskedastic probit
estimates. The “level” effect (labeled “old-level” in the table) is the unbi-
ased estimate, and the “variance” effect captures the difference in the var-
iance for older applicants.59 For all jobs combined, the resulting estimate
of discrimination (20.080) is slightly larger in absolute value, which, to-
gether with the slightly larger variance of the unobservable for older work-
ers, is consistent with the resumes being, on average, lower-quality thanwhat
employers observe, in which case the higher variance for older workers
generates a bias against finding age discrimination.60 We also find either
similar or stronger evidence of discrimination for the two jobs to which
females apply. For administrative applicants the level effect (20.054) is
close to the effect estimated from the probit model (20.067) and, while
less precise owing to the more demanding estimation, is still significant at
the 10 percent level (consistent with the relative standard deviations being
close to one).61 For female sales applicants, the evidence of discrimination58 Regardless, imposing equal variances of the unobservable can still lead to biased esti-
mates of discrimination.
59 This is explained further in the table note.
60 To see this, define the following notation: F is the standard normal distribution func-
tion; c is the hiring threshold; bI is the probit coefficient on the observable characteristics
on the resume (only one is used here, for simplicity); X I* is the level at which the observable
characteristic is set in the experiment;g is the discrimination coefficient; and jS II and jY II are
the standard deviations of the unobservable for senior (older) and younger workers. Then
the hiring probabilities for older and younger applicants are, respectively,
Pr T P X I*, XS
IIð ÞjS 5 1ð Þ 5 1½  5 F bIX I* 1 g 2 cð Þ=jS II½ ,
Pr T P X I*, XY
IIð ÞjS 5 0ð Þ 5 1½  5 F bIX I* 2 cð Þ=jY II½ :
If X I* is standardized at a low level, then bIX I* < c. In this case, a larger variance for older
workers, jS II > jY II, can generate
F bI
I* 1 g 2 cð Þ=jS II½  > F bIX I* 2 cð Þ=jY II½ 
even when g 5 0—a bias toward spurious evidence of discrimination in favor of older
workers.
61 The evidence of age discrimination for administrative jobs was stronger when the spam
responses were dropped, as expected. In estimates corresponding to col. 2 of table 8, when
we dropped these responses the old-level (marginal) estimate was20.081, significant at the
1 percent level (vs. 20.054, significant only at the 10 percent level, in the table). The old-
variance (marginal) estimate remained small and statistically insignificant.
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 965strengthens; the estimated level effect is20.161 versus the probit estimate
of 20.093.
For male job applicants the findings are more mixed but overall still
do not provide clear evidence of age discrimination. For sales jobs, the
estimate of discrimination falls to near zero (20.005) from an estimate
of20.044. For security jobs, the evidence of discrimination strengthens,
with the estimate rising from20.028 to20.058 (significant at the 10 per-
cent level). For janitor jobs, the bias-corrected estimate of discrimination
is much larger, 20.153 versus 20.062, but recall from table 6 that low-
experience resumes generate spurious evidence of age discrimination.
Indeed, when the unobservables analysis was reestimated using only the
high-experience resumes, the estimated level effect fell by half and was
not statistically significant (p -value5 .38).62 Discounting this occupation,
then, the unobservables correction leaves relatively little evidence of age
discrimination for men (only for security workers, and then significant
only at the 10 percent level).
Thus, the heteroskedastic probit estimation that addresses the Heck-
man critique reinforces the evidence of age discrimination for women.
The evidence for administrative applicants (all of whom are female) is re-
inforced, and the evidence of discrimination for female sales workers be-
comes considerably stronger. For men, the analysis generally weakens the
evidence of age discrimination, except for security jobs.
What is gained by using the more complicated and less precise estima-
tor that addresses the Heckman critique? First, without this correction it
is not clear what we identify, and there is a good a priori reason to expect
unequal variances by age. Second, in our view the less conclusive evi-
dence for men is not an argument against the approach, especially when
coupled with evidence that, for women, it delivers informative estimates;
rather, it shows us that the evidence formen is in fact unclear. At the same
time, there sometimes is not strong statistical evidence against the restric-
tion to equal variances of the unobservables.On this point, wewould plead
“common practice.” Labor economists generally implement less precise
procedures intended to eliminate bias even when the data do not reject
the hypothesis of no bias; put differently, we do not commonly weight var-
iance heavily (if at all) in using a mean-squared error criterion for choos-
ing estimators. Finally, the bias-corrected estimates are in some cases suffi-
ciently precise that the larger uncorrectedestimates of discriminationwould
remain significant with the standard errors resulting from the heterosked-
astic probit estimation (cols. 1, 2, and 4, or three of the five cases in which
the probit effects are significant). Nonetheless, for the sales applications
we saw that the skill variables used to correct the bias did not have strong62 In addition, the ratio of standard deviations of the unobservables fell from 1.66 to
1.33, consistent with the low-experience resumes providing less information to employers.
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Allpredictive power, so for these occupations additional evidence with skill
variables that more strongly shift callbacks would be useful.VI. ConclusionsWe conducted a new correspondence study of age discrimination, adding
features to address two potential sources of bias in past studies, as well as
other potential challenges to interpreting differences in callback rates
as evidence of age discrimination. Our correspondence study is by far
the largest that has been attempted, with about 40,000 job applications,
and strives to maximize the credibility of its findings by grounding the
many design elements that make up such studies in empirical evidence
on job applicants and the job application process. Even with our innova-
tions, there may still be challenges in using AC methods to study age dis-
crimination. We believe we have presented an objective discussion of all
of these challenges and how our study helps address them, but readers
will of course have to make their own assessment of our efforts on which
to base their interpretation of the evidence.
We have a number of central findings. First, we findmuch stronger and
more robust evidence of age discrimination against older women than
against older men.63 Second, we find stronger evidence of discrimination
against older applicants near retirement ages (64–66) than againstmiddle-
aged workers (49–51), who have been the focus of past research. This new
evidence on retirement-age workers is relevant to policy efforts to encour-
age older people to work longer. Third, for the most part we find that us-
ing resumes for older applicants with experience comparable to that of
younger applicants (as in past studies) does not bias the evidence toward
finding age discrimination.However, for one of the three jobs ( janitors) to
which we send male applicants—the one job that otherwise provides the
strongest evidence of discrimination against oldermen—our evidence does
suggest that using low-experience resumes generates spurious evidence of
age discrimination. Fourth, wefind that the evidence of age discrimination
for women is robust to correcting for the bias identified by the Heckman
critique, while the evidence of age discrimination for men is not robust.
AC studies cannot definitively distinguish among different mechanisms
of discrimination—most importantly, taste versus statistical discrimina-
tion. However, we believe our analysis and results make it less likely that
some of the most plausible sources of statistical discrimination against
older workers explain our findings.63 Another recent US correspondence study by Farber, Silverman, and vonWachter (2017)
provides corroborating evidence of age discrimination against women. The study focuses
more on the effect of unemployment duration than of age discrimination but finds evidence
of lower callback rates for women aged 55–58 (compared to 35–37 and 40–42) who apply to
administrative support jobs (one of the jobs in this study).
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is it harder for older workers to find jobs? 967Why might older women be more likely to experience age discrimina-
tion than older men? Evidence suggests that physical appearance matters
more for women ( Jackson 1992) and that age detractsmore fromphysical
appearance for women than for men (e.g., Deutsch, Zalenski, and Clark
1986).64 If older women suffer from discrimination because of both age
and sex, antidiscrimination laws may be less effective than thought; be-
cause Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits sex discrimination,
is separate from the ADEA, “intersectional” claims of age discrimination
against older women are difficult to bring before the courts (Song 2017).
We do not know whether these factors explain our evidence. But the
stronger and more robust evidence of age discrimination against older
women than against older men suggests that researchers should do more
to see if this finding, itself, is robust, to understand the sources of these
differences, and potentially to point out howpolicy efforts to extendwork-
ing lives might productively focus on reducing discriminatory barriers to
older women’s employment.
We believe that our experimental design and analysis substantially im-
prove on the prior research. At the same time, we want to be clear that
there are somepotential limitations in our study that future research could
potentially address; some are specific to studying age, and some are more
general. First, it is difficult to distinguish between statistical and taste dis-
crimination, yet the distinction is important for both understanding be-
havior and designing policy responses. One could imagine a follow-on
experimental study that tried to focus specifically on this question, per-
haps by explicitly signaling health differences or by eliciting information
on selection decisions from employers. Second, the method used to cor-
rect for bias from differences in the variance of the unobservable (the
Heckman critique) hinges on at least one coefficient on the skill-related
resume characteristics being equal across age groups. While there is an
overidentifying test, the identifying restriction is untestable, and there
are reasons to expect the effects of at least some of these characteristics
to differ by age.65 Other potential solutions to the Heckman critique that
do not rely on this assumption would hence be valuable. Third, given that
older and younger workers differ on experience, the standard paradigm
of making applicants identical on all characteristics except age (in this
case) is likely inappropriate, but at the same time it is not crystal clear what64 This is consistent with evidence in Kuhn and Shen (2013) and Hellester, Kuhn, and
Shen (2014) from job descriptions posted on internet job boards in China and Mexico
on which employers often express preferences for workers based on age and sex. These
papers find a “twist” in relative preference away from women with age, with greater prefer-
ence for women in job descriptions seeking young workers and for men in job descriptions
seeking older workers.
65 For example, there are cohort differences (which to employers are the same as age
differences) in the returns to schooling (Heckman et al. 2006; Lemieux 2006).
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Allthe alternative should be.Wehavedesignedolder applicants’ resumes with
matched versus commensurate experience, and other experience pat-
terns, and find that the results are generally (but not always) robust. Still,
the interpretation of an age difference in callback rates is not necessar-
ily identical to the interpretation of similar differences in audit or corre-
spondence studies of other groups, and there may be alternative ways to
address the age-experience issue. Finally, both the original Heckman cri-
tique and the solution used in this paper are based on an assumption that
the callback/hiring process is based on a threshold model. It could be
useful to think about how to interpret data from AC studies in the con-
text of other models of hiring decisions, which could also, perhaps, lead
to different experimental designs to learn more about the nature of dis-
crimination.
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